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THE DEMOCRACY OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES*
CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR.F

Oliver Wendell Holmes is everywhere recognized as a great American. His life story has been depicted on the stage, fictionalized in a
popular biography,' and majestically summarized in the Dictionary of
American Biography by his successor and disciple. 2 Every undergraduate knows of Holmes' wounds in three Civil War battles, his
seminal lectures on The Common Law delivered at the Lowell Institute, his pioneer decisions in labor cases in the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts and his long and distinguished tenure as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. But the recital of
his public offices does not disclose Holmes' contribution to the fundamental need of our society. For he was not in title or in fact the
commander-in-chief of his own generation. He sought the joy of the
thinker "who knows that . . . men who never heard of him will be
moving to the measure of his thought -the subtile rapture of a postponed power, which . . . is more real than that which commands an
3
army."
Instead of reviewing here the details of his biography or analysing
the precise contours of the cases he decided, I propose to concentrate
on the democratic ideas which Mr. Justice Holmes embodies in three
fields- the powers of popular government, the civil liberties of the
citizen and the dignity of man. These will be admittedly mere strands
plucked from a pattern. I should not want anyone to suppose that I am
attempting an essay on the man as a whole. All I seek is to assay
certain of his ideas which, though they will be, nay have been, to
some extent superseded, seem to me to have eternal relevance to
democracy and therefore to be of constant interest to every American.
* This essay is based on a lecture given by the author at Brown University
in the fall of 1950. It was one of the Marshall Woods lectures delivered by

various speakers depicting five outstanding exponents of American democracy
and .analyzing their contributions. The subjects included four presidents Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt -

and one judge -

Oliver Wendell Holmes.

t Uiiited States District Judge, District of Massachusetts.
1. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS (1944).

2. Frankfurter,Oliver Wendell Holmes, 21 DIcT. Am. BIoG. 417 (1944)..
3. Lecture delivered to undergraduates of Harvard University, Feb. 17,

1886, reprinted in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 31, 33 (Lerner ed.
1943).
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.Icomefirst to Mr. Justice Holmes' views of the powers of popular
government. Etymologically this clearly belongs at the forefront of
any discussion of democracy. For from the Greek days when the word
was coined, democracy has at the least embraced the idea of 'that
form of state in which the people as a whole share public authority.
In the United States "democracy" has sometimes been defined :with
its original literal significance- the classic example being the triad
in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Yet during the first century of the
history of the United States- the period during which we were most
often described as a "republic" - the actual role of the people diVerged sharply from that in a Greek democracy.
Our orthodox eighteenth and nineteenth century view of popular
government turned for philosophical justification not to Plato . or
Aristotle but to Locke and Montesquieu, and for practical techniques
notl'o the colonies on the Eastern Aegean founded by Athens but to
tlitte on the Western Atlantic founded by England. The essence of the
'firditional American theory is that democratic government is limited
in its methods and its objects, that the division of powers amongst the
executive, legislative and judicial branches is the core of AngloAmerican liberty, that the federal balance between the nation and
the states is the secret of strength without tyranny and of selfgovernment without provincialism, that the people express their wisdor' not in determining policies but in choosing representatives and
that the maximum goal of the state is to prevent force or fraud from
interfering with the self-development of the individual man.
. Whether this theory be labelled constitutionalism or the system
of
checks and balances or representative government or laissez-faire,
it is the one set forth in most high school courses in civics. It is the
picture of American government drawn by as serene and sophisticated observers as the omniscient historian Lord Acton and the knowledgeable ambassador Lord Bryce. More important, it was the view
of popular government which nineteenth century Justices of the Supreme Court proclaimed not only from the bench but also from the
platform, as the published lectures of Justices Miller, Brewer and
Harlan reveal.
How far did Holmes subscribe to this theory?
*3fore I try to answer the main question I must not avoid a preliminary hurdle. Does a judge in -his official capacity ever have a
theory of government-or, to put it less in psychological terms and
more in philosophical form- should a judge in his official capacity
have a theory of government?
No informed observer supposes that a judge is a variety of impersonal calculating machine who merely applies the law. He does
not automatically render an answer mechanically derived from learning first the facts from the litigants and second rules of law from books
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in a library. His judgments are not predictable by lawyers as .ecipses
are predictable by astronomers. He does not, Mr. Justice Rob~erts to
the contrary notwithstanding,4 decide a case by laying the ext' of a
statute against the text of the Constitution to see whether it squares.
Every constitutional judge to some degree, and self-conscious judges
like Holmes to a large degree, applies in his judgments the, policies
which he believes represent the sober second-thought of the community and are suited to its inarticulate needs. Of course, I have not
meant to indicate that a judge is always free to rule according to, his
discernment of the long-term public interest. The area of his freedom
is limited- perhaps the boundaries have never been better described
than by Judge Cardozo in The Nature of the Judicial Process- but
nonetheless, as the multitude of dissents in the Supreme Court have incontrovertibly proved to our citizenry, there are some cases where
there is an area of choice and, when he is within it, the judge consciously or unconsciously reveals his theory of government. Even an
abstention from decision is a revelation of choice - a choice to entrust
power' to other hands more competent, more flexible or more responsive to popular will.
Before Holmes came to the Court and during most of his tenure
the majority of the Justices were enforcing with full vigor and without abdicating much to the judgment of others what I have called the
orthodox theory of American democracy. The majority held that the
national government was severely circumscribed in its fields of interest. It had no right without an amendment to the Constitution to
lay an income tax on individuals, or to prevent the shipment in interstate commerce of child-made goods, or to control monopolistic practices in manufacturing industries. The majority also held that both
the national and the local governments must move warily where they
trench on property rights. They could not in time of peace fix minimum wages or regulate maximum prices or preclude an employer from
discriminating against union labor. And courts, if they were to be
faithful to the Anglo-American tradition, must not allow the legislature to give administrative agencies a judicial power to find the
ultimate facts in controversy and to enunciate and apply the governing
rules of law.
The familiar decisions to which I have somewhat eliptically'referred
were, it is hardly necessary to say, superficially cast in terms of legal
rather than political, economic or philosophical doctrines. The judges
who wrote the majority opinions purported to find their reasons in
the scope of the taxing power
the fundamental law of the land -in
conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution or in the scope of the commerce power conferred on Congress
4. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477
(1936).
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by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution or in the limits
imposed by the "due process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution or in the implications of Article III
that judicial power can be reposed only in what are formally designated as courts of the United States. But there were no precise words
in the test of the constitutional provisions which compelled this logic.
And, as Holmes' opinions illustrated, a quite opposite course of reasoning was possible for one who started with a more enlarged view of
constitutional democracy.
The starting point with Holmes was his awareness that "the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is
to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but
by considering their origin and the line of their growth." 5
Our charter of government was intended to endure for ages and to
be adaptable to a changing world and to the growth of men's experience and enlargement of their vision. It did not, as Holmes said,
"enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"6 or for that matter Locke's
Civil Government. The provisions of the United States Constitution
are not to be read as a petrification of past practice. They are set in a
context calculated to remind us of the historical forces which originated, and of the contemporary allegiances which preserve, a balance
between national and state governments. They are phrased in terms
not of subject matters to be regulated by government but in terms of
powers available to government. This is because just as individuals
use their powers to create new forms of organization and to embark
on new lines of activity to serve their own interests, so the people as a
whole through their government are free to create new forms of
regulation and to embark on new fields of welfare with the object of
keeping all groups of private interests adjusted to each other. They
are couched in language of utmost generality. For the Constitution excludes from the area of permissible regulation only a few topics, and
those. for the most part the so-called civil liberties. And even on the
excluded topics the Constitution offers less an inflexible rule of limitaconstant appeal to the
tion than a broad counsel of moderation -a
only half-articulated spiritual traditions that give substance to the
promise of American life.
Applying these principles in litigation where the national government and the state governments conflicted, Holmes was one of the foremost in recognizing the overriding rights of the nation. Some may see
in this the deeper impact upon his mind of his services as a soldier
1 5., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. 1115
(1914).
6. Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937
(1904).
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in the Union cause than of his services as a state judge. In any event
he was alert to invalidate state tax or police action that revealed discrimination against, or even much theoretical interference with, the
commerce among the several states. He said in an oft-quoted passage "I do not think that the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperilled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States." 7
And as a corollary to that observation, he was more willing than most
of his contemporaries to allow the national Congress to reach its regulatory arm into what were once thought to be local business concerns.
His opinion in the first child labor case and his extension of the Sherman anti-trust statute to cover the packers' operations will serve as
illustrations.
Of perhaps greater significance as an example of Holmes' democracy
was the constancy with which as a judge he voted to allow governments both local and national to experiment with novel forms of
regulation, of which as a voter or legislator he might have disapproved.
The Supreme Court reports are replete with his explanations of these
judicial votes, perhaps the most familiar being the statement in Truax
v. Corrigan:8
"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to
those whose judgment I most respect."
The temper of that quotation explains how Holmes voted to sustain
minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, state laws which imposed compulsory insurance for banking deposits, public regulations
of employment contracts and many other measures which in his private correspondence the Justice would have characterized as socialistic humbug.
Holmes' willingness to tolerate change, variety and experimentation
accounts for his attitude toward another facet of orthodox democratic
theory. He was as familiar as any statesman with the oft-proclaimed
virtues of the separation of powers, and he was aware how many
interpreters of our Constitution have found these virtues enshrined not
merely in certain constitutional clauses but in the very textual structure of the document - Article I dealing with the legislative power
of Congress, Article II dealing with the executive power of the Presi7. Law and the Court (1913), in COLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1921).

8. 257 U.S. 312, 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254 (1921).
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dent, Article III dealing with the judicial power of the Courts. Yet
Holmes was receptive to the needs of modern society to establish
agencies 'of government which mingled these supposedly separate
powers. He showed this in his votes in cases involving the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the government of the territories we acquired after the Spanish-American
War. In many of these cases, however, he was less the pioneer than
the second to Mr. Justice Brandeis, the chief judicial expositor of the
most original affirmative powers of our twentieth century democracy
agencies, governmental corporations and public au-administrative
thorities of mixed functions.
So far we have been considering Holmes' attitude toward the affirmative aspects of popular government- the powers which may be exercised by nation and state. But in a democracy limitations upon
governmental power are equally significant. "The wise restraints that
make men free" are restraints upon public authority as well as restraints upon private persons. And it is, therefore, appropriate to
consider now Mr. Justice Holmes' attitude toward civil liberties.
Even before we adopted our Constitution we announced in the
Declaration of Independence our belief in the inalienable rights of man
a doctrine whose genesis has been so admirably studied in Professor Carl Becker's famous historical monographs. 9 And this stress
upon individual rights and civil liberties was carried further in the
habeas corpus provision in the Constitution of 1789 and the first ten
amendments of 1791. The safeguards of these amendments, as Ambassador Thomas Jefferson's letter of March 15, 1789 to Congressman
James Madison reminds us, were inserted because of "the legal check
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." Thus in the Jeffersonian
and Madisonian no less than in the Hamiltonian and Marshall view
the judges of our courts were specifically authorized to invalidate such
public action as was repugnant to those particular civil liberties which
are guaranteed by the Constitution.
But when Holmes ascended the bench in Washington in 1902 this
authority had been sparingly exercised in the fields which most concerned Jefferson and Madison. A 1902 catalog of cases in which civil
liberties had been successfully invoked would be surprisingly short.
Property rights, to be sure, had been protected in the nineteenth century by invoking first the "obligations of contract" clause of Article I,
Section 10 and later the "due process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But what we ordinarily embrace within the concept of civil liberties or human rights had hardly been appreciated as
constitutional rights subject to vindication by the Courts, as is convincingly shown in Professor Commager's slender though exhaustive
9. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:

POLITICAL IDEAS (2d ed. 1942).

A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
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volume on Majority Rule and Minority Rights. Indeed Holmes himself
applying constitutional principles as a Massachusetts state judge had
not been disturbed at a New Bedford police rule which denied a policeman the right to discuss political issues, or at the Boston ordinance
which denied citizens the right to make a speech on the Boston Common without a permit from the Mayor.
The twentieth century, however, brought great changes in Holmes'
viewpoint and later in that of the majority of the Court.
To my mind the most important change was not in the field of free
speech as is sometimes asserted. It was the recognition that fair procedure in criminal trials conducted in state as well as federal courts is
a civil liberty so fundamental to our democracy that it is covered -by
the constitutional assurance of "due process." When this point was
first pressed it was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Indeed as recently as 1915 in Frank v. Mangum, 0 where the defendant
had been convicted by a Georgia state jury which was terrorized by
a mob surrounding the courtroom, only Justices Holmes and Hughes
thought that the Federal Supreme Court was warranted in invoking
the due process clause or any other constitutional provision to set
aside the sentence. The majority view was that so long as the state
authorities outwardly followed the established form of trial the defendant could not successfully assert that his constitutional rights had
been impaired by what was in substance lynch law. Today the dissent
of Holmes is regarded as almost self-evident. And from Holmes' doctrine have stemmed the myriad of cases which lay down as fundamentals of our democratic system protected by the Supreme Court the
right 6f a defendant in any criminal court in the land to a trial which
is open to the public and free of outside pressure, which admits no
evidence secured by torture or by third degree methods or by perjury
known to the prosecution and which assures a defendant the right to
the assistance of counsel in meeting a charge of undeniable gravity.
Indeed Holmes' dissents go further than the law has yet gone in precluding the conviction of defendants upon the basis of evidence which
had been procured by wire-tapping or other methods which he described as "dirty business.""
A second and much more widely known phase of Holmes' work in
the field of civil liberties concerned freedom of speech. Here his
influence not only on the law but on political theory and philosophy
has perhaps been unmatched by any single American, although as I
shall say in a minute it is not clear that this country now accepts
his doctrines without qualification as adequate to meet the changed
circumstances of the contemporary world.
10. 237 U.S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 (1914).
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944

(1928).
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It was in the aftermath of World War I that Holmes first faced a
large volume of cases in which the free speech issue was predominant.
In one of these, the Schenck case, he stated in a sentence familiar
to every newspaper reader that "The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
12
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
This is not the occasion to trace the origin of that doctrine, to show
how much it owed to Holmes' youthful studies of the common law of
criminal attempts and how much it owed to his reading of Milton's
Areopagitica,to his knowledge of the history of John Adams' administration and to his personal friendship with John Stuart Mill, Frederick W. Maitland, Sir Frederick Pollock and Leslie Stephen. Yet
without drawing that genealogical tree, we must recognize that
Holmes' doctrine of the limits of free speech is the final crystallization of Nineteenth Century Liberalism. The doctrine is an admirably
consistent series of deductions from two initial premises-that man
is a reasoning animal and that, given time and space, reason will
dissipate not merely error but danger as well. These deductions have
captured countless readers partly because of the undeniably superb
logic with which they move from the assumed premises, but even
more because of the haunting poetry in which Holmes enshrined them.
Let us stand in the back of the courtroom and hear him read his immortal opinion in the Abrams case: 13
"... when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While
that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country."
Who can doubt the practical wisdom, the noble philosophy and the
enduring strength of that passage-the most eloquent in all our
court reports? Does it not belong with the two great memorial
12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470
(1919).

13. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173
(1919).
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speeches of the democratic tradition-the one of 431 B.C. and the
other of 1863 A.D.?
I am not prepared to deny the implication of these questions. Yet
I want to invite you before applauding to consider carefully whether
you agree not with Holmes' deductions but with his premises? Is man
a reasoning animal and, given time and space, will reason dissipate
not merely error but danger as well?
Holmes wrote before the world had fully appreciated the wickedness of which civilized man is capable. He knew not the Nazi concentration camps, nor the Goebbels propaganda for circulating the big
lie, nor the Communist disciplined subordination of man's interest
in truth to man's interest in material progress, nor the use of domestic
dissidents as auxiliaries of a foreign state, nor the speed with which
in our modern technological society forces of evil purpose may overwhelm the majority of peaceful men. Holmes wrote without reading
Kierkegaard and Niebuhr and without hearing of Fuchs and Eisler.
If Holmes knew what we know would he ask the right to reconsider
his premises and would he invoke as an avenue of retreat his most
famous epigram, "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience"?
It is plain that some who have oft repeated their allegiance to
Holmes' creed would do so. Consider the impressive opinion of Judge
Learned Hand given in affirming the conviction of the eleven Communist leaders 14 and the action of the Supreme Court in affirming that
decision 15 or the decision of the Supreme Court upholding that provision of the Taft-Hartley Act which denies the privileges of the Na16
tional Labor Relations Act to unions which have Communist leaders;
or the action of the Congress in enacting the Internal Security Act
of 195017 over a presidential veto.
For one who has my other duties it would be inappropriate to make
a personal comment upon those recent manifestations of our democracy. But I may without impropriety observe that it is only by rewriting Holmes' premises, recasting his criteria of judgment and
adding uncanonical qualifications to his formulas that judges and legislators of contemporary times have reached the results which the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries seem, at least in the pressure
of the moment, to endorse.
We do not live in an era which looks with placid self-assurance
upon nonconformity. We have not the civil courage, the confidence
in other men's capacities, the consciousness of ultimate victory to
14. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
15. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 Sup. Ct. 157, 95 L. Ed. 1137
(1951).

16. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674,
94 L. Ed. 925 (1950).
17. 64 STAT. 987 (1950).
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admit as full partners in our society those who will not take without
reservation the oaths we set before them. This is not the place to say
whether we shall be justified before the bar of history. But those who
subscribe to the dissents of Holmes in the Schwimmer 8 and Macintosh1 9 cases must recognize that in the circumstances of his day he
was prepared to allow a broader liberty to dissenters, malcontents and
radicals than are our statesmen in the circumstances of our day, a day
in which this country has reached a new high in physical resources,
in armament, in productive facilities, in employment and in liquid
capital, if not in spiritual leadership.
I turn now to the final point, Mr. Justice Holmes' attitude toward
what some would regard as the central belief of the true democratthe dignity of the individual man.
It is worth emphasizing at the outset what have been the sources
of that belief-for, as we shall see, they include some currents in
which Holmes was never caught up. One of the main sources has
been natural law; another the Judaic-Christian religious tradition;
and a third the classical influence of Greece and Rome on England
and her offspring.
Holmes in letters, essays and legal opinions often attacked natural
law concepts as a mere attempt to dress up as eternal verities our own
limited experiences and hopes. He had no use for absolutes, legal or
philosophic. Man did well to form generalizations of what was good
and true and beautiful but the generalizations had no claim to be ultimate standards or to be final criteria of judgment. "The best that has
been thought and said in the world" was of profound interest, but
it was no copy of a Platonic set of universal ideas good semper ubique,
marketable as coinage of the heavenly realm. Man could never find
a pure gold fit for a universal standard. For him it was enough to
learn how to mine, to refine, to use the alloyed metals of this earth.
These mundane minerals were to be tested pragmatically. They were
to be fitted into some workable and passable currency for our daily
needs-on the understanding, of course, that the system of values was
purely artificial, devised for convenience and subject to devaluation
or revaluation whenever experience dictated.
To the Christian or any other formal religious discipline the mature
Holmes never professed to be an adherent. He would not have denied
that there was a power bigger than himself-he wrote that he knew
he was in the belly of the cosmos and not the cosmos in him. But he
irreverently referred to the deity as the Great Panjandrum who had
not disclosed the plan of campaign, if indeed there is one. While he
admired his father's friend, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and imbibed from
18. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889
(1927).
19. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302
(1931).
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him and older New England divines a sense of obligation and of
Puritanical duty, he did not share their faith in God which gave New
England its distinctive Transcendentalism.
Intellectually he was a skeptic. His ideas were not far different from
those of the early Santayana - the author of The Life of Reason.
And at times, as on his ninetieth birthday, Holmes could summarize
in severely physical terms the insignificance of man's existence; "To
live is to function. That is all there is in living."20 But this rigorous
separation of what he knew from what he did not know was never
uttered in arrogance or pride. Indeed he disdained the impetuous defiance of our modern Prometheus, Bertrand Russell, who as Pollock
said thought himself "a valiant fellow for throwing stones at God
'21
Almighty's windows."
Yet this intellectual skepticism was to some extent balanced by a
desire to plunge himself into the full tide of emotional forces in a
way that would have astonished a complete Pyrrhonist like Montaigne.
There was something far deeper than an imperturbable materialism
in the judge who told a Harvard graduating class that a soldier's
faith was "true and adorable" even "in a cause which he little understands,"22 in the Civil War veteran who told his former comrades in
arms that "it is required of a man that he should share the passion
'23
and the action of his time at peril of being judged not to have lived,
and in the American citizen who saw mere belittling innuendo in
Charles Beard's portrait of the framers of the American Constitution as businessmen motivated by concern for their own investments. 24
Holmes fully acknowledged the power of things of the spirit. He could
never have enthroned as an ultimate trinity Freud, Marx and Darwin
and said that the combination of their psychological, economic and
biological theories explained the totality of life. For Holmes' rejection
of the theological system was a rejection of all systems on the ground
that life was too big, too multifarious, nay too mysterious to be
comprehended. He rejected the parson for his certitude and his narrowness -but he did not delude himself with any lesser substitute
of cocksureness.
Was then Holmes' attitude toward man classical in its origin?
Some have persuasively argued that Holmes was an incurable romantic
leading the younger generations to a wasteland where agnosticism,
violence and force hold sway. But Holmes had none of the optimistic
20. Radio address on occasion of his ninetieth birthday, reprinted in UN-

COLLECTED PAPERS 142 (Shriver ed. 1936), also in THE MiND AD FAITH or
JUSTICE HoLMEs 451 (Lerner ed. 1943).
21. 2 HOLMEs-POLLOCK LETTERS 159 (Howe ed. 1944).
22: Memorial Day Address, 1895, reprinted in THE MIND AND FAITH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 18, 20 (Lerner ed. 1943).
23. Memorial Day Address, 1884, reprinted in THE MinD AND FAITH OF
JUsTICE

HoLMEs 9, 10 (Lerner ed. 1943).

24. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK

LETTERS

237 (Howe ed. 1944).
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exuberance, love of the wildness of nature or the admiration for
the varieties of eccentricity which characterized his two great contemporaries in literature and philosophy, Walt Whitman and William
James. The latter he regarded as a sentimental Irishman; the former's
poetry is never quoted and never pulls at his vitals like Sophocles'
Philoctetes or Dante's Divine Comedy.
If by the classical tradition in the Anglo-American world we mean
the emphasis on the rounded man who conscious of the ideal of
excellence disciplines himself to perform competently and unobtrusively and without being diverted whatever task falls to his hand, confident that every detail has significance and that every task greatly
done makes the world more meaningful to the doer, then Holmes was
a classicist. For Holmes, though he did not proclaim that human goals
were eternal goals, never doubted that man could rise above the
particulars of a sordid existence. If he could not discover God's
purposes, he could nonetheless live a purposeful life of his own
designing.
For himself, Holmes, at least after his Civil War years, chose as
his design what may seem an austerely solitary life -first that of
a scholar and then of an appellate judge. He never participated
in the struggles of the market place nor of the political hustings nor
even, to any substantial extent, of the trial court. He did not follow
with reasonable closeness the diurnal conflict of other men's existences-going so far as often to avoid reading the daily newspaper.
He never sought the spotlight of public attention and contemned those
who advertised their own distinction. Cloistered in the library of his
home he read voluminously mostly philosophical, historical, classical
and juristic literature, interspersed with occasional French novels and
current humorous books. He talked to and corresponded exclusively
with the intellectual elite. His public appearances were virtually
confined to four or five hundred hours a year on the bench in the
former Senate Chamber in the Capitol. There he seldom spoke, but
when he put one of his rare questions, it cut like a stingray to the
heart of the case he was hearing. And then he went home to Eye Street
to stand erect behind a tall bookkeeper's desk to write with a deft and
sparkling pen opinions that "with a singing variety" epigramatically
crystallized his profound insights.
In reading this description of Holmes you may have asked yourself
whether I have shown the democracy of Holmes or his aristocracy.
Quite plainly if democracy is the apotheosis of the lowest common
denominator and if, to use Holmes' phraseology, every "great swell"
is by definition an aristocrat, then the Holmes view of man was not
democratic. But does democracy imply that the ideal man is the
average man? Historically surely it does not, as Pericles would be the
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first and Franklin Roosevelt the latest to teach us. Democracy no less
than aristocracy has always stressed the dignity or, if you please,
the nobility of man. The difference between the aristocratic and the
democratic philosophies is that in an aristocracy the terms dignity
and nobility connote titles founded on the accident of birth or principles of invidious selection from an artificially restricted field. In a
democratic society the same terms are reserved for those who have so
disciplined themselves that their countenances, their conduct, their
code command respect. And it is in this sense that Holmes is a
supreme instance of one democratic ideal of the dignity of man.
He has not, no man born in 1841 could have, given the answers
suitable to our modern technological economy, to our new world
order, to the rising tide of collectivism and, above all, to our crisis of
faith. But like the Winged Victory of Samothrace he is the summit of
hundreds of years of civilization, the inspiration of ages yet to come
without being the foundation stone of any new school. He is the
final authentic representative of the period of English democracy in
America- the period that spans from 1607 to World War II.
But some of you may not be quite content to give Holmes that role
unless I meet head-on a point now often pressed by detractors of
the Justice. Despite the grandeur of the man and the style with
which he carried off his life, was Holmes a believer in any durable
values, democratic or otherwise? In his refusal of allegiance to any
church, in his pervasive intellectual skepticism, in his praise of the
soldier's faith apart from the soldier's cause, in his emphasis on adventure and on power, would he not have been as much at home in
the world of Hobbes or of Hitler as of Jefferson or of Lincoln? Was
he only a glorious specimen of Nietzsche's life force, a superman who
but for the accident of birth into a Brahmin Beacon Hill family might
have turned his theories and his talents to support an evil, destructive
power?
One can make a superficial collation of Holmes' epigrams to fortify
this sort of critical question. And there are some writers who have
recently done so in theological pamphlets and bar journals. Holmes is
himself not without blame for this criticism because he delighted to
arouse his audience and stamp their memories with a witty or poetic
phrase. He never spoke with cautious pedantic exactitude, qualifying
every "bully generalization" with the express proviso that it was a
mere apercu, understandable only as one of a series of partial visions.
He invited the reader to cull his brocades out of context.
Yet we shall make a fundamental mistake if we assume that because Holmes was so happy a phrase-maker, because he was so disdainful of all absolutes and because he refused to accept or announce
a systematic approach to the universe, his philosophy can be reduced
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to the two principles that "whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it
with thy might"2 5 and let thy neighbor go in peace.
Rigorous standards for himself and tolerance of his neighbor were,
to be sure, two important articles of his creed. Yet each of these
derived from this more basic postulate: although absolute truth, undiminished beauty, unalloyed good are not to be found by man, the
never-ending quest for the true, the good and the beautiful is the
activity most satisfying to man. Even if the quest serves no cosmic end,
even if when the earth has made its last revolution round the sun
not a trace of man's long journey will be left in any heaven or hell,
nonetheless the search for truth and beauty and goodness seemed as
desirable to Holmes as it was inevitable for him. And the final glory
of the democratic life, as Holmes exemplified it and extended it, is that
democracy keeps every door open to searchers for ultimate values
and demolishes every irrelevant barrier standing athwart the oncoming adventures in ideas.
25. Life as Joy, Duty, End, reprinted in THE
HOLMES 42 (Lerner ed. 1943).
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